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 1 
FOREWORD 
 
Nuclear power is a proven technology and has the potential to generate virtually 
limitless energy with no significant greenhouse gas emissions. Nuclear power can 
become one of the main options to contribute to substantial cuts in global greenhouse 
gas emissions.  
 
Modern development of nuclear power technology and the established framework of 
international agreements and conventions are responding to the major political, 
economic and environmental issues -high capital costs, the risks posed by nuclear 
waste and accidents, and the proliferation of nuclear weaponry- that until recently 
hindered the expansion of nuclear power. 
 
In response to such prospects, the WFEO Energy Standing Committee set up a Task 
Group to develop this Report on NUCLEAR POWER FEASIBILITY - 2008. This Report 
gathers information on the state-of-the-art of nuclear energy technology and its current 
technical and economic feasibility based on engineering criteria and technological 
maturity. 
 
Members of the Task Group were appointed by WFEO Member Organizations.  
 
This Report is being presented as a publication in the Energy Standing Committee 
Series on Feasibility of Current Energy Options. The Series is intended to give the 
viewpoint of the engineer on questions related to technical and economic feasibility of 
energy issues of significance to society. It aims at providing the engineer and decision-
making officers with updated information regarding the state-of-the-art of different 
technologies that are being used or are under consideration for the supply of energy.  
 
WFEO hopes this report will assist the engineering community, policy and decision 
makers, and the public to be aware of the conditions that make nuclear power 
utilization a feasible option for assuring sustainable development and mitigation of 
climate change effects. 
 
 
Barry J. Grear AO 
President, World Federation of Engineering Organizations 
December 2007 
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NUCLEAR POWER FEASIBILITY 
 
 
 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Nuclear power is a proven technology and has the potential to generate virtually 
limitless energy with no significant greenhouse gas emissions.  
 
Modern development of nuclear power technology and the established framework of 
international agreements and conventions are responding to the major political, 
economic and environmental issues related to high capital costs, the risks posed by 
nuclear waste and accidents, and the proliferation of nuclear weaponry. 
 
Nuclear power share of worldwide electricity production rose from less than 1 percent 
in 1960 to 16 percent in 1986, and that percentage has held essentially constant in the 
21 years since 1986. Nuclear electricity generation has grown steadily at the same 
pace as overall global electricity generation. In December 2007, there were 439 
operating nuclear reactors around the world, and 34 more under construction [1].  
 
At the close of 2006, nuclear provided about 15 percent of total electricity worldwide. 
The US had 103 operating units. France was next with 59 and Japan followed with 55, 
plus one more under construction. Russia had 31 operating units, and seven more 
under construction [2]. Of the 30 countries with nuclear power, the percentage of 
electricity supplied by nuclear ranged widely: from a high of 78 percent in France; to 54 
percent in Belgium; 39 percent in Republic of Korea; 37 percent in Switzerland; 30 
percent in Japan; 19 percent in the USA; 16 percent in Russia; 4 percent in South 
Africa; and 2 percent in China. 
 
Assuming that all nuclear capacity currently under construction or firmly in the 
development pipeline gets completed and attached to the grid, without any further 
capacity added, the nuclear installed capacity will grow from 370 GW(e) at the end of 
2006 to 447 GW(e) in 2030. In a high projection -which adds reasonable and promising 
projects and plans- global nuclear capacity is estimated to rise up to 691 GW(e) in 
2030. That would represent an average growth rate of about 2.5%/yr [3].   
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2 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
2.1 NUCLEAR ENERGY PHYSICS 
 
2.1.1 Molecules, Atoms, Nuclei, Isotopes 
 
Ordinary matter around us, whether solid, liquid or gaseous, is made of atoms. Almost 
the whole mass of an atom is gathered within its nucleus, an assembly of protons and 
neutrons (the «nucleons»), with the former carrying a positive electrical charge. A cloud 
of electrons is located around the nucleus. There are as many electrons as there are 
protons. Each electron, of very low mass, has a negative electric charge that is equal, 
in absolute terms, to the proton charge. The atom is therefore electrically neutral.  
 
The chemical nature of an atom is determined by the number of protons in its nucleus. 
This number can range from 1 in the case of hydrogen to 92 for uranium. Two atoms 
that have the same number of protons but a different number of neutrons are known as 
the isotopes of a single chemical element. For instance, uranium has two main 
isotopes: uranium 238, 238U, whose nucleus has 92 protons and 146 neutrons, and 
uranium 235, 235U, whose nucleus has 92 protons and 143 neutrons.  
 
Several atoms can join together a part of their electron cloud to form molecules (or 
crystals). Chemical energy, which only concerns electrons, is produced when atoms 
and molecules join together and separate. Nuclear energy, on the other hand, is 
released when the components of the nucleus assemble or disassemble through 
fusion, radioactivity and fission. 
 
Some atoms, or rather their nuclei, can disintegrate (radioactivity or fission) or fuse 
together, processes which implicate the components of the nucleus: such is the origin 
of two nuclear energies, respectively called fission and fusion energy. Those nuclear 
energies are roughly 1 million times larger than chemical energy, which does not 
involve nucleons. For instance, the fission of one gram of uranium releases more 
energy than the combustion of one metric ton of oil. 
 
2.1.2 Radioactivity 
 
Some atomic nuclei are unstable: they spontaneously transmute themselves into other 
nuclei, with different properties. When this transformation occurs, the nucleus emits 
radiation, i.e. particles or electromagnetic rays. Such nuclei are called radioactive. The 
radioactivity of a given nucleus is specific: this radioactivity is characterized by the type 
of radiation emitted, its energy, and the rhythm governing the decay of the nucleus. 
 
While it is impossible to predict at which precise time one radioactive nucleus will 
undergo decay, the amount of time necessary for half of a given nuclei population to 
have decayed is known with great statistical precision. This characteristic amount of 
time, noted T1/2, is called half-life of the radioactive nucleus.  
 
The main types of radiation emitted by radioactive nuclei are the following: 
 
Alpha (α) radiation is the emission of a very energetic helium nucleus, made of two 
protons and two neutrons. α radioactive nuclei are mostly heavy nuclei, and often with 
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long or very long half-lives. For instance, uranium 238, 238U, is α radioactive and its 
half-life is 4.5 billion years, about the age of our solar system (creation of the Sun and 
its planets.)  
 
Beta (β-) radiation is the simultaneous emission of one electron and one neutrino, a 
small particle of extremely tiny mass, the interaction of which with matter is too low. 
The kinetic energy of the electron can vary considerably: they are accordingly being 
called “hard” or “soft” beta rays.  
 
Gamma (γ) radiation is the emission of photons by excited nuclei which get rid of their 
excess energy without changing their nature. A gamma ray is a form of 
electromagnetic radiation like visible light or X-rays, only more energetic. γ radioactivity 
can occur by itself, but if often occurs together with the α and β- radiation. 
 
2.1.3 Natural and Artificial Radioactivity 
 
Radioactivity was discovered in 1896 by Henri Becquerel, as he realized that uranium 
salts spontaneously emitted invisible and penetrating rays, able to blacken 
photographic plates and to make air conductive of electricity. In 1898, Pierre and Marie 
Curie extracted from uranium ore two new elements, which emitted much more 
powerful radiation: the element polonium, and the element radium, of world renown. 
They coined the word radioactivity to describe this phenomenon.  
 
Artificial radioactivity was discovered in 1934, by Irène Curie, Marie’s daughter, and 
her husband Frédéric Joliot. They irradiated a thin aluminum plate with α rays from a 
polonium source. They observed radiation as well as the creation of silicon and 
phosphorus. Following their example, researchers started to irradiate all known nuclei 
with various forms of radiation and to produce many other «artificial» radioactive nuclei. 
 
Whether «natural» or «artificial», radioactive atoms emit the same forms of radiation, 
with identical effects on live beings. Protections against radiations are identical: 
keeping distance, limiting exposure time and using shielding materials. 
 
2.1.4 Radiation Units: Becquerel, Gray and Sievert 
 
The activity of a substance is the number of its atoms which undergo decay per unit of 
time. Activity is measured in becquerels: 1 Bq = 1 decay per second (irrespective of 
the type of radiation). One becquerel is an extremely tiny unit. 
 
The radiation dose measures the energy deposited by radiation in a substance per unit 
mass. Dose is expressed in grays: 1 Gy = 1 joule/kilogram. 
 
Some parts of the body are more sensitive to the effects of radiation than others, and 
some types of radiation are inherently more dangerous than others, even if they 
deposit the same level of energy. To take these characteristics into account, tissue 
weighting factors and radiation weighting factors have been developed. These can be 
combined with a measurement of absorbed dose of radiation to give an effective dose. 
To quantify the biological effects of a radiation absorbed by a living tissue, one uses 
the unit of equivalent dose which is the sievert Sv. The millisievert (mSv), 1000th of a 
sievert, is the more usual unit for the sorts of exposures found in day-to-day life. For 
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instance, the average equivalent dose received from natural sources is about 2.4 mSv 
per year.  
 
2.1.5 Origin of Nuclear Energy 
 
Everyone is familiar with Einstein's formula E = mc2, which is more accurately 
expressed as:  ∆E = - c2 x ∆m  , where c is the velocity of light (3 x 105 km/s). 
 
This formula states that mass and energy are two forms of the same reality that can be 
interchanged under certain conditions, and that a slight variation in mass represents an 
enormous variation in energy. The total mass of a nucleus is thus lower than the sum 
of the masses of all the protons and all the neutrons that make it up, and the difference 
in mass is the binding energy of the nucleus, generally expressed in millions of electron 
volts or MeV. 
 
The most stable combination of nucleons happens to be a medium-sized nucleus. This 
means that if two light nuclei can be fused to form a medium-sized nucleus, some 
binding energy will be released, and if a heavy nucleus can be split into two medium-
sized nuclei, such energy will as well be liberated. These two phenomena are known 
respectively as nuclear fusion and nuclear fission (Fig. 1). 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Fusion and Fission Processes 
 
2.1.6 Nuclear Fission 
 
Some heavy nuclei are fissile after having absorbed a neutron: the «composite» 
nucleus is too excited and gets rid of its extra energy through simple decay, like an 
oversized drop of water: it violently splits into two unequal fragments, while at the same 
time ejects two or three neutrons. This phenomenon is called fission. The total mass 
of the fragments and neutrons is slightly smaller than the mass of the composite 
nucleus. Energy is therefore released. Most of the energy is released as kinetic energy 
Iron 
MeV/nucleon 
Atomic Mass 
Fission 
Fusion 
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of the fragments. When the fragments slow down, this kinetic energy becomes heat. It 
is this heat which is transformed into electricity in nuclear plants.  
 
Neutrons ejected during one fission can, in turn, be absorbed by other neighboring 
fissile nuclei, thus creating a chain reaction. If this chain reaction is left to develop 
exponentially, one gets a nuclear explosion. If the reaction is controlled and stabilized, 
one gets an energy source: this is what happens in a nuclear reactor. 
 
Both fission fragments are almost always radioactive, and undergo successive 
radioactive decays. Together, fission fragments and their daughter elements are called 
fission products. Fission products constitute most of the high level radioactive waste. 
 
The only readily fissile nucleus found in the Earth crust is an isotope of uranium, whose 
atomic mass is 235. This isotope constitutes 0.7% of natural uranium. On the other 
hand, when a nucleus of the other isotope of natural uranium, uranium 238, absorbs a 
neutron, it gets transmuted into fissile plutonium. This plutonium can, as well, generate 
energy in a nuclear reactor. Another naturally occurring isotope, thorium 232, can also, 
by absorbing a neutron, turn into a fissile isotope, uranium 233. Uranium 238 and 
thorium 232 are called fertile. 
 
Fission was discovered in late 1938 by the German research team led by Otto Hahn. In 
Chicago, USA, on December 2nd 1942, the first man made nuclear chain reaction was 
produced in the atomic pile CP1 designed and built under the leadership of Enrico 
Fermi. The use of nuclear fission to produce electricity in nuclear power plants dates 
from the mid 50s: 1954 for the Obninsk reactor in the Soviet Union, and 1956 for the 
Calder Hall plant (UK) in the western world. 
 
Today all the nuclear power (over 2600 billion kWh per year) is produced by nuclear 
fission. Nuclear fission is also used to power military ships, mostly submarines and air 
carriers, in the USA, Russia, the UK, France and China. Russia operates six nuclear 
ice-breakers. 
 
2.1.7 Nuclear Fusion 
 
Nuclear fusion is the source of the energy radiated by the stars, including our Sun. The 
actual fusion reactions occurring within the stars cannot be achieved on Earth, but one 
can, at very high temperatures (100 millions K) fuse together the nuclei of two 
hydrogen isotopes, according to the reaction: 
 
D + T    He + n + 17.4 MeV 
 
where D, deuterium or 2H, is made of one proton and one neutron, while T, tritium or 
3H, is made of one proton and two neutrons. Deuterium is a stable isotope of natural 
hydrogen, though in low concentration, but tritium is radioactive and decays with a half-
life of 12 years. Tritium therefore must be produced, using the neutron emitted in the 
fusion reaction and one isotope of lithium:  
 
6Li + n    T + He 
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Both D & T nuclei have a positive electric charge and repel each other. To overcome 
the electrostatic repulsion (the “Coulomb barrier”), they must be given high kinetic 
energy, hence the very high temperature, where atoms are fully dissociated in free ions 
and electrons and matter becomes a “plasma”. 
 
Fusion was first achieved through the H-bomb, where the necessary energy to ignite 
the fusion reactions is supplied by an A-bomb. Controlled fusion is much more difficult 
to achieve.  
 
The main method to force D and T nuclei to meet and undergo fusion is to vastly 
increase their velocity by thermal agitation. That means heating the “plasma” to 100 or 
150 million degrees. Of course, one cannot let this ultra-hot plasma in contact with any 
material wall: it must be contained within some kind of magnetic bottle through a 
combination of electric field and extremely powerful magnets. This method is called 
Magnetic Containment Fusion (MCF). 
 
The best experimental fusion device, the “Tokomak”, was invented in the mid 50s by a 
Russian team led by L. Artsimovitch. Inside a Tokomak, a very low density plasma D-T 
(100,000 times lower than the density of air at atmospheric pressure) is contained 
within a donut shaped metallic vessel by a series of magnetic coils and heated by 
Joule effect. Since their invention, tokomaks have undergone great improvements, and 
their performances have increased by several orders of magnitude.  
 
Seven partners (European Union, Russia, Japan, USA, China, South Korea and India) 
have pooled their effort to develop together a reactor-size Tokomak called ITER 
(International Tokomak Experimental Reactor), located in Cadarache (France), which 
should produce its first plasma by the end of 2016 and carry its experiments at least 
over 15 more years.  
 
ITER its expected to bring the physical demonstration of controlled MCF by producing, 
over several minutes, more energy from fusion reactions than will have been required 
to heat the plasma. The success of the ITER experimental program will not be enough. 
It will be necessary, in addition, to implement a complete program to develop materials 
suited for this technology, notably the materials facing the plasma which must 
withstand very high temperatures as well as an intense high energy neutron irradiation. 
 
Fusion offers a tremendous prospect of very abundant energy, but there are still many 
hurdles to overcome before starting a first reactor prototype, not to mention commercial 
maturity.  
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3 NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
 
A nuclear reactor produces energy in a controlled way by splitting the nuclei of 
elements such as uranium and plutonium present in its “fuel”. 
 
In a nuclear power reactor, the heat released from continuous fission of the nuclei in 
the fuel is used to make steam. The steam is used to drive the turbines which produce 
electricity (as in fossil fuel power plants).  
 
Figure 2 
A schematic diagram of a typical Nuclear Power Plant 
 
Fig.2 shows one of the most common types of a nuclear power plant, based on the 
Pressurized Light Water Reactor (PWR). It has the following components: 
 
Fuel.  
Pellets of uranium oxide UO2 or mixed oxide MOX (UO2, PuO2) piled up in tubes form 
fuel rods. The rods are arranged into fuel assemblies in the reactor core. 
 
Moderator.  
This is material which slows down the neutrons released from fission so that they 
cause more fissions. In PWR, it is ordinary water, but it may be heavy water or graphite 
in other types of reactors. “Fast neutron” reactors do not have any moderator. 
 
Control rods.  
These are made with neutron-absorbing material such as cadmium, hafnium or boron, 
and are inserted or withdrawn from the core to control the rate of reaction, or to halt it. 
Secondary shutdown systems involve adding other neutron absorbers, usually in the 
primary cooling system. 
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Coolant.  
A liquid or gas circulates through the core in a close loop (the primary circuit) so as to 
transfer the heat from it. In light water reactors the moderator functions also as coolant. 
 
Pressure vessel.  
A thick and sturdy steel vessel contains the reactor core and moderator/coolant. In 
other reactors, it may be a series of pressure tubes holding the fuel and conveying the 
coolant through the moderator. 
 
Steam generator.  
This is a specific heat exchanger where the heat from the reactor is transferred from 
the primary circuit to make steam for the turbine. 
 
Containment.  
There is a very resistant structure around the reactor core which is designed to protect 
it from outside intrusion and to protect those outside from the effects of radiation in 
case of any major malfunction inside. It is typically a meter-thick concrete and steel 
structure, often double walled in modern plants. 
 
Most reactors use “slow” or “thermal” neutrons to maintain the fission chain reaction, 
because they interact much more readily with the fissile nuclei. The most common 
moderator is ordinary water because the hydrogen nucleus, a single proton, is most 
efficient to slow the neutrons down. Reactors moderated (and cooled) by ordinary 
water are called LWR, for Light Water Reactor. Since light water absorbs neutrons and 
slows them, it is less efficient as a moderator than heavy water or graphite. In such 
reactors, the fuel cannot be made of natural uranium: it needs to be “enriched”. Natural 
uranium has the same isotopic composition as when it was mined (0.7% 235U, over 
99.2% 238U). Enriched uranium has had the proportion of the fissile isotope (235U) 
increased by a process called enrichment, commonly to 3.5 - 5.0%. During the 
irradiation in the power reactor, part of the 238U nuclei absorbs neutrons and is 
transmuted into fissile plutonium 239Pu, which compensates, but only partly, the fission 
of 235U nuclei. 
 
After a period of operation, these LWR need to be shut down for refueling, and the 
pressure vessel is opened up. In this case refueling is at intervals of 1-2 years, when 
1/4 to 1/3 of the fuel assemblies are replaced with fresh ones. Practically all fuel is 
ceramic enriched uranium oxide (UO2 with a melting point of 2,800°C). The fuel pellets  
(usually about 1 cm diameter and 1.5 cm long) are typically arranged in a long 
zirconium alloy (zircaloy) tube to form a fuel rod, the zirconium being hard, corrosion-
resistant and permeable to neutrons. Up to 264 rods form a fuel assembly, which is an 
open lattice and can be lifted into and out of the reactor core. In the most common 
reactors these are about 3.5 - 4.0 meters long. 
 
One distinguishes two families of LWR: the Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR, or VVR 
in its Russian version) and the Boiling Water Reactor BWR.  
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3.1 TYPES OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 
 
Table 1 shows the number and the capacity of the different types of power reactors in 
operation or under construction as of end of December 2007 [1]. Their characteristics 
are described below. 
 
Type Nr. Operating GWe Nr. under Construction GWe 
PWR + VVR 
BWR 
GCR 
HWR 
RBMK 
FBR 
 265 
 94 
 18 
 44 
 16 
 2 
243.4 
85.0 
9.0 
22.4 
11.4 
0.7 
 25 
 2 
  
 4 
 1 
 2 
22.1 
2.6 
 
1.3 
0.9 
1.2 
Total  439 371.9  34 28.1 
 (Source: IAEA PRIS-Dec 2007) 
 
Table 1 
Reactors in operation and under construction at end of Dec.07 
 
3.1.1 The Pressurized Water Reactor PWR (or VVR) 
 
In the PWR, the coolant in the primary circuit is maintained as a liquid through high 
pressure (typically 15 MPa) at a temperature close to 300°C. In the steam generator, 
the heat is used to boil water in a close loop “secondary circuit” and produce steam at 
a pressure around 7 MPa. This steam rotates a turbine coupled to an alternator which 
generates electricity. 
 
The low pressure steam is then returned to liquid water in a “condenser” and recycled 
within the secondary circuit. The condenser is cooled by water pumped from a river or 
from the sea, or cooled by air in cooling towers. Initially developed to power nuclear 
submarines, the PWR (or VVR) has become the most popular reactor type. 
 
3.1.2 The Boiling Water Reactor BWR 
 
In the BWR, the water is allowed to boil in the core, and the primary steam, under 7 
MPa, goes directly to the turbine.  The overall design is simpler since there is no 
secondary circuit, but the large variation of moderator density along the core height 
calls for a more complicated core design. 
 
3.1.3 The Heavy Water Reactor HWR (or CANDU) 
 
One of the best possible moderators is heavy water D2O, where D stands for 
deuterium, an isotope of hydrogen whose nucleus is composed of one proton and one 
neutron. Heavy water slows neutrons almost as efficiently as ordinary water but its 
does not absorb neutrons. Deuterium is found in seawater at very low concentration, 
but increasing its concentration is expensive and needs energy. Owing to its moderator 
efficiency, HWR can use natural uranium without enrichment.  
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Most HWR, the CANDU types initially developed in Canada, have horizontal pressure 
tubes (rather than a pressure vessel enclosing the reactor core). They can and must be 
refueled while still generating electricity by disconnecting individual pressure tubes. 
This is called on-line refueling. 
 
3.1.4 The Graphite Moderated Water Cooled Reactor RBMK 
 
Apart from ordinary and heavy water, the other moderator practically available is 
graphite. Graphite hardly absorbs any neutron but its nuclei are heavier and less 
efficient to slow them down. As a result, graphite moderated reactors have large sizes 
and low power density, and they must be refueled on-line. 
 
In the RBMK, of soviet origin, the coolant is ordinary boiling water flowing in vertical 
pressure tubes. Fueled with slightly enriched uranium, RBMK were designed both to 
generate electricity and produce weapon-grade plutonium. The technology of RBMK 
safety relies too heavily on human control which is not up to modern operational 
standards. The worst nuclear accident in history occurred in a RBMK, the Chernobyl 4 
reactor in Ukraine. However, nowadays, Russia is completing one unit with improved 
safety conditions. 
 
3.1.5 The Gas Cooled Reactor GCR 
 
Graphite moderated reactors can also be cooled by gases, usually carbon dioxide CO2. 
Earlier GCRs, sometimes called Magnox, used natural uranium as metal rods. More 
modern GCRs, called AGRs, used slightly enriched uranium as oxide pellets. The last 
remaining GCRs all operate in the United Kingdom and all should be decommissioned 
by 2020. The modern helium cooled and graphite moderated High Temperature 
Reactor (HTR, PBMR) is somehow a successor of the GCRs. 
 
3.1.6 The Fast Breeder Reactor FBR 
 
While slow neutrons interact more efficiently with fissile nuclei, fast neutrons are able to 
extract energy from uranium 238. Present thermal neutron reactors use at best 1% of 
the potential energy of natural uranium. FBRs can extract almost 100% of this potential 
energy, by transmuting “fertile” 238U into 239Pu through successive recycles. 
 
To avoid slowing down the neutron population, FBRs cannot use water as coolant: they 
use molten metals like sodium. In the future, helium gas will also be used as coolant. 
The FBR technology is highly sophisticated, which results in higher capital costs: only 
prototypes have operated till now. 
 
3.2 GENERATION IV 
 
Nuclear reactor technologies are often described in terms of “generations”. 
 
Generation I reactors were the early prototypes of the pioneer era. Many different types 
of reactor were designed and tested, with a rapid escalation in size and no 
standardization. With embryonic regulations still under development, these reactors 
were built very quickly and many would not be licensed today. All those Generation I 
plants are now decommissioned and several have been completely dismantled. 
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Generation II reactors are those operating today, as described on Table 1: they supply 
16% of the world’s electricity (some 2,600 TWh). 
 
Generation III reactors are: 
 being built today, ABWR in Taiwan and EPR in Finland and France (Fig. 3), or  
 just ordered, AP 1000 in China (Fig. 4), or  
 still waiting for their first order, ESBWR (Fig. 5), SWR and ACR 1000 (Fig. 6).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 
EPR Layout 
 
All of them are water moderated, and exhibit some kind of technological continuity with 
Generation II LWRs and HWRs1. What makes them differ from Generation II reactors 
comes from the fact that they were designed after the Chernobyl accident. There were 
few technical lessons to be learned from this accident, very specific to the RBMK 
design, but one: any new massive release of radioactivity in the environment is 
unacceptable. Generation III reactors are designed so that even a full core meltdown, 
an extremely improbable event, would not result in such a release. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 The ACR is moderated with heavy water, but cooled with ordinary water, and must use slightly enriched uranium 
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Figure 4 
Schematic diagram of the AP 1000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 
Features of the ESBWR 
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While Generation III reactors are starting their deployment, R&D is being carried out in 
a multinational framework to prepare Generation IV, to be commercially available 
around 2040. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
The ACR 1000 Characteristics 
 
 
Generation 4 reactors will have to overcome the main limitations of present day 
designs, in order to make nuclear power really sustainable: 
• Make better use of the fissile material resources, 
• Reduce the long-term radio-toxicity of radioactive waste, 
• Offer better protection against terrorism and proliferation, 
• Reduce capital costs (notably through shorter construction times), 
• Be able to offer other services than electricity (desalination, process heat, 
hydrogen, etc.) 
 
Six designs are being considered as potential candidates for this Generation IV: three 
types of FBRs (sodium cooled, lead-alloy cooled and gas cooled), one reactor cooled 
by supercritical water, one high temperature gas cooled reactor and one reactor fueled 
and cooled by a molten salt. In order to have some of these designs commercially 
available by 2040, prototypes should operate around 2020. 
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4 THE FUEL CYCLE AND ITS DIFFERENT STAGES 
 
The term nuclear fuel is applied to an element that can produce heat through the 
fission of the heavy atoms it contains. Uranium ore does not provide nuclear fuel 
directly. In order for heavy nuclei to generate usable heat through fission, they must 
undergo a fuel cycle consisting of many industrial stages. Fuel cycles depend on the 
type of reactor and the choice of fissile and fertile isotope pairings. 
 
4.1 THE LWR FUEL CYCLE 
 
The LWR fuel cycle is outlined in Fig. 7. 
Plutonium
U Mine
Concentration
Waste
Fabrication
shearing &
processing
kWh
Reactor (3 to 5 years)
Unat
enriched
depleted
Enrichment
 
Figure 7 
LWR Fuel Cycle 
 
The typical PWR fuel cycle is made up of the following stages: 
• Extraction of uranium ore from underground mines, open quarries or in-situ 
leaching, 
• Concentration of the ore (which often contains less than 1% uranium) on the 
extraction site (production of yellow cake), 
• Conversion of uranium concentrates into uranium hexafluoride, UF6, which is solid 
at ambient temperature and turns into vapor at moderately high temperatures, 
• Isotope enrichment of UF6 to increase the concentration of fissile 235U nuclei, as it 
is too low in natural uranium, 
• Fuel manufacture (i.e. conversion of the fluoride into enriched uranium oxide, UO2; 
pellet manufacture; pellet sintering; fuel rod manufacture, and assembling the rods 
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• Production of electricity in the reactor for about 4 years, 
• Temporary storage of the spent fuel under water, 
• Spent fuel management and eventually recycling of recoverable materials. 
 
There are many inspections and some transportation between each of the above 
stages. Each stage is a complete industrial process by itself, as shown above. 
 
Each installation involved in the fuel cycle, i.e. enrichment, manufacturing or 
reprocessing, is large enough to produce fuel for 20 to 30 large reactors. The fuel cycle 
is international by its very nature. 
 
4.1.1 Once-Through Cycle and Closed Cycle 
 
The last stage – spent fuel management – is different for the closed cycle, set out in 
the diagram above and adopted in France, and the once-through cycle, adopted 
notably in the U.S. and other European countries. 
 
The once-through cycle –which in fact is not a cycle at all– ends with the final disposal 
of the spent fuel, in this case written off as plain waste. 
 
The closed cycle includes the following sub-stages: 
• Chemically processing the spent fuel to recover any remaining fissile and fertile 
materials for recycling purposes, 
• Recycling the plutonium into MOX fuels and enriching residual uranium, 
• Conditioning waste, in particular, vitrifying high-level radioactive waste left over 
from fission, 
• Final disposal of conditioned waste. 
 
Many countries have not really made their choice between the two cycles and keep 
their spent fuel in interim storage, waiting for a final decision. 
 
4.1.2 Uranium Prospecting and Resources 
 
Uranium is the heaviest natural element remaining on earth. Its nucleus is surrounded 
by 92 electrons. It is composed mainly of two isotopes, 235U and 238U.  
 
Isotope Half-life (years) Current relative abundance on earth (as % U total) 
235 713 million 0.720 
238 4.47 billion 99.275 
 
Table 2 
Isotopic Composition of Natural Uranium 
 
Chemically speaking, uranium is similar to chromium and tungsten. It is an element 
with a clear affinity for oxygen and is found in at least two hundred minerals. The 
Earth's crust contains on average 3g of uranium per ton. Uranium is found in all rocks 
and soils and in particularly high concentrations in phosphates and certain types of 
granite or igneous rock. It can also be found in granite and sedimentary ground, and 
even in water. 
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Radiometric prospecting is the geophysical method used specifically for uranium 
detection as it is based on radioactivity. In actual fact, radium is detected more readily. 
Radium is a daughter product of uranium and its radiation is more penetrating. 
Radiometric prospecting can be performed on foot, from a land vehicle or by aircraft for 
large grids and regions where access is difficult. 
 
Although correctly interpreted radiometric measurements can be used to detect 
uranium ore deposits, they give little information as to the quantity or concentration of 
the ore. Additional information can be obtained using electrical, electromagnetic and 
magnetic devices, and by geochemical surveys.  
 
World identified resources recoverable at a cost of less than 130 $/kg uranium amount 
to some 4.7 million tons [4]. It must be pointed out that, during the 80s and 90s, the 
market price of uranium was so low as to completely discourage any exploratory effort. 
With uranium prices having soared in the last few years, world uranium prospecting 
has been drastically resumed and those figures can be expected to be revised 
upwardly.  
 
Table 3 shows the distribution of world reserves among the main producers. Most of 
the uranium produced in the world currently comes from Canada, followed by Australia 
and Niger. Extremely large high-grade deposits are still to be mined in Australia and 
Canada. Other lower-grade or less easily reached deposits represent considerable 
potential reserves. It can be seen that some of today's large consumers, e.g. Japan 
and the European countries, or potentially large consumers, e.g. China or India, are 
particularly poorly endowed with this natural resource. 
 
Country % of World Reserves 
Australia  24 
Kazakhstan  12 
Canada  9 
South Africa  7 
USA  7 
Namibia  6 
Niger  5 
Russian Federation  4 
Uzbekistan  3 
 
Table 3 
Breakdown of World Uranium Identified Reserves (< $ 130/kgU) 
 
 
Currently, a question is repeatedly posed: can these reserves be described as 
extensive? For the sake of comparison, some 2 million tons of uranium have been 
produced since the dawn of the nuclear industry; 1.2 million tons of this amount were 
consumed in civil reactors, and the rest went into stockpiles.  
 
At the present rate of consumption (67,000 tons in 2005), "cheap" reserves should last 
between 50 and 100 years. Mining less rich deposits could bring this number well 
above 200 years. But it must be borne in mind that a growing nuclear fleet will 
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significantly expand the consumption of the year 2005. Beyond that, the millions of tons 
of uranium contained in phosphates, (and perhaps the billions of tons contained in the 
oceans) could then be tapped. More important, the “breeders” technology has been 
already developed, though not yet economically competitive it can extract roughly 50 to 
60 times more energy from a given amount of uranium than present LWRs. These 
breeders can also use the huge existing stockpiles of depleted uranium. With the 
breeders, there is enough uranium for many centuries under any credible scenario of 
nuclear development. Breeding could also allow using thorium as a fuel, which is more 
abundant than uranium probably by a factor of two or three. 
 
4.1.3 Uranium Extraction and Conversion 
 
At the yellow cake stage, the uranium must first be converted into uranium hexafluoride 
or UF6 (gaseous) to undergo isotope enrichment. The first step is to purify the yellow 
cake to rid it of neutron-absorbing elements such as boron or cadmium, or other 
elements that form volatile fluorides liable to contaminate the uranium hexafluoride 
produced at a later stage.  
 
The purified uranyl nitrate solution is then converted into uranium oxide powder, UO3, 
and then into UO2. The oxide powder, UO2, is then fluorinated by hydrofluoric acid. The 
uranium tetrafluoride, UF4, thus obtained is converted into uranium hexafluoride UF6 by 
fluorinating it again with gaseous fluorine. The uranium hexafluoride is then transferred 
to the enrichment plant in solid form in pressurized containers. 
 
4.1.4 Uranium Enrichment 
 
Uranium enrichment has been closely linked with the use of light water nuclear 
reactors, which are the most widespread among nuclear reactors today. The fuel for 
these reactors must be enriched from 0.7% to around 4% in 235U. 
 
The physical properties of a pure element depend on its isotopic composition, but 
these differences in properties are generally slight and not easy to exploit for the 
purposes of isotope separation. The chemical properties of elements generally depend 
very little on the isotope considered, which makes isotope separation all the more 
difficult by chemical means. The processes implemented use the difference in the 
mass of the isotopes to be separated, either directly (mass spectrometry and 
centrifugation), or indirectly (gas diffusion). 
 
a) Cascades 
All current separation methods have a small or very small elementary separating 
power, which calls for the use of a cascade design, where each elementary step is 
repeated until the required degree of enrichment Np is obtained (Fig. 8). The cascade 
is often made up of two parts, the larger of them being devoted to the actual 
enrichment. Other stages are also used to deplete the residues in order to optimize the 
separation performance of the cascade. In Fig. 8, each rectangle represents an 
elementary separation step. P (product), W (waste), F (feed) represent flows, and Np, 
Nw and Nf the isotopic abundance.  
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Figure 8 
Example of a cascade 
 
The degree of depletion chosen depends on economic optimization taking into account 
the price of natural uranium and the cost of enrichment. The higher the value of Nw, 
the easier the enrichment process, but the greater the consumption of raw materials. In 
order to achieve successful economic optimization, the notion of separative work unit 
(SWU) is introduced. This is a unit of measurement combining isotope abundance and 
the three flow rates. Fig. 9 illustrates the typical values of these parameters for civil 
uranium enrichment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9 
Material Enrichment Flows and SWUs 
 
The SWU is also the commercial unit of measurement used for enrichment. The 
"typical" 900 MWe reactor consumes about 100,000 SWU/year, at a rate of 5 SWU/kg 
U, enriched to 3.7% from natural uranium. 
 
8 kg of natural U 
(NF = 0.71%) 
1 kg of U enriched 
to 3.7% 
7 kg of U depleted 
to 0.25%
 
5  SWUs  
Enrichment 
W, NW 
Depletion 
P, Np 
F, NF 
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b) Gaseous diffusion 
Gaseous diffusion was the first uranium isotope enrichment process to be used on a 
large industrial scale. The gaseous diffusion process for uranium enrichment uses a 
gaseous compound of uranium, uranium hexafluoride (UF6). The molecules of 235UF6 
(mass 349) travel faster than those of 238UF6 (mass 352) and, over the same period of 
time, produce a greater number of impacts on the walls of the recipient containing 
them. Given these conditions, if gaseous UF6 is diffused through a porous wall, then 
the 235U enrichment of a fraction of the gas downstream from the barrier will be slightly 
higher than for the total gas upstream from the barrier at the start. The elementary 
effect is small since the enrichment factor for UF6 is low, in practice around 1.002. This 
means that a cascade must have a large number of separative units (1,400 in the 
Eurodif plant). Such a plant is large and remarkably visible and cannot be used for 
enriching uranium beyond its design level. 
 
This process will no longer be adopted for future plants mainly because of its 
considerable power consumption. All recent plants use the process described below, 
the centrifuge process. 
 
c) Centrifuge Process 
This process involves rotating a cylinder containing UF6 gas at very high speed (Fig. 
10).  
 
Figure 10 
Uranium Enrichment Centrifuge 
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The heaviest molecules gather at the edge of the cylinder, while the lightest ones 
mostly migrate towards the center. The typical enrichment factor for this process is 1.3, 
a much higher value than that obtained with gaseous diffusion. Depleted and enriched 
fractions are caught by scoops – small tubes fitted at both ends of the cylinder at 
carefully optimized distances from the wall. As the gas is fed in and caught by the 
scoops, a counter-current forms along the rotational axis of the cylinder – which is 
vertical – and transforms the radial isotopic gradient into an axial gradient. With this 
optimized axial current, a centrifuge works rather like a distillation column: the current 
flowing upwards is gradually enriched with U 235 while the downward current is 
depleted. 
 
The cost structure of a centrifuge plant is dominated by high investment costs and 
extremely low operating costs. Centrifuges are highly reliable in the case of models 
that have reached technological maturity. The power consumption of centrifuge plants 
is very low. Those plants can be unobtrusive and could, if un-safeguarded, be used to 
produce highly enriched weapon-grade uranium. 
 
d) Laser process 
Laser enrichment processes have been the focus of interest since the 70s. Being 
isotope-specific rather than statistical, these processes promise lower energy inputs, 
lower capital costs and lower tails assays. However, technological problems, mostly 
linked to materials behaviour and lifetime, have kept those processes at the 
experimental stage in the USA (AVLIS), France (SILVA) and Japan.  
 
A promising laser process to be developed is SILEX, an Australian concept which is 
molecular and utilises UF6. In 2006, GE Energy (now GE-Hitachi) entered a partnership 
to develop the SILEX process renamed “Global Laser Enrichment”. In August 2007, 
GE-Hitachi announced it planned "to complete a test loop program at the end of 2008 
which, if successful, would open the way for the first commercial enrichment plant to be 
constructed."  
 
4.1.5 Fuel Manufacture 
 
Nuclear fuel design objectives are based on the following criteria: 
• Providing the power required by the reactor for the entire duration of the planned 
cycles, while adapting to the power variations imposed by the grid. 
• Containing fission products under normal, incident and accident operating 
conditions within design limits. 
• Achieving the lowest possible cycle cost by optimizing the use of available fissile 
material. 
 
The above objectives generate technical and technological requirements, the most 
important of which are: 
 
• High power density. 
• High level of reliability combined with a long lifetime: the fuel assembly, its structure 
and the rods making it up must withstand without failure throughout its time in the 
reactor, currently 4 to 5 years, with a target of 6 years by 2010. 
• Leak tightness: in incident and accident situations, nuclear materials must remain 
perfectly contained for safety reasons. The fuel rod cladding forms the first 
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containment barrier (the other two are the primary system and the containment 
building). 
• Under extreme accident conditions, even if cladding failures are unavoidable and 
the fuel assembly is deformed, it must still be possible to cool the fuel. 
• In spite of these performance requirements, the fuel design must remain simple: 
this need for simplicity applies to all stages, i.e. manufacturing, handling, 
transportation, repair, and, after use, storage. In most cases, particularly in France, 
it must also be suitable for "reprocessing". 
 
In addition, the materials chosen for the structure of the assembly and cladding must 
take into account their resistance to irradiation and corrosion. 
 
The fuel assembly of a light water reactor is always made up of rods containing the 
nuclear material. These rods are arranged in a square grid in a structure designed 
principally to provide mechanical support for the fuel rods. 
 
In a pressurized water reactor, this structure is open and the coolant can flow across 
the assemblies. On the other hand, in a boiling water reactor the structure is closed 
and each set of fuel rods is enclosed in a casing which prevents cross flows. 
 
One preliminary step of the fuel fabrication process involves defluorinating the uranium 
hexafluoride (UF6) to convert it into oxide (UO2).  
 
The actual fuel manufacturing process then includes the following steps: 
• Manufacturing the materials, chiefly zirconium alloys, and parts, tube cladding and 
structural parts. 
• Preparing fuel pellet powder (UO2) or (UO2 and PuO2), including powder recovered 
from previous manufacturing runs. 
• Pellet manufacture: shaping cylindrical pellets and "sintering" them, i.e. baking the 
pellet ceramics. 
• Rod manufacture: inserting the pellets and sealing the rods. 
• Assembly and storage. 
 
Each of these steps includes controls on the compliance of physical criteria (geometry, 
density, and appearance), chemical criteria (exact degree of oxidation, impurities, etc.), 
and isotope criteria (235U abundance, and plutonium abundance). Quality assurance 
requirements also impose maximum traceability of materials, equipment and 
operations so that the history of each element can be reconstructed and its origin 
guaranteed. 
 
4.1.6 Spent Fuel Management 
 
While the fuel assembly produces energy in the reactor core, the fuel loses fissile 
elements and accumulates poisons; it becomes less and less reactive, until it finally 
stops producing energy. It is at this stage that it becomes "spent" and must be replaced 
with fresh fuel in the core.  
 
When spent fuel is removed from the core, it is still composed of roughly 95% uranium, 
much less enriched than it was initially and slightly "poisoned" by other non-fissile 
isotopes, about 1% plutonium, various fission products and a few minor actinides. It 
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has served its purpose. It must now be disposed of in a way that protects the public 
from the radioactive products it contains. 
 
The residual uranium and plutonium can be extracted and recycled to produce more 
energy. The savings obtained from this recycling operation depends, of course, on the 
market price of the fresh fissile material it saves. 
 
Most fission products are highly radioactive. Although this makes them very hazardous, 
it also means that they decay rapidly. For example, if they have a half-life of 30 years, 
which is the case for two of the most abundant isotopes, it means that only one-
thousandth of them remains after 300 years, and practically all of them have 
disappeared after a thousand years.  
 
At the other end of the spectrum, some elements have such a long half-life that they 
are not very radioactive and thus present little danger. Between these two extremes 
are the elements that present the greatest problem, as they are quite radioactive and 
have a significant half-life. Most actinides, in particular plutonium, fall into this category. 
 
A spent fuel assembly has not only lost its capacity to produce energy; but its 
weakened structures also contain a complex blend of radioactive products with 
extremely varied physical and chemical forms and radioactive half-lives. It has to be 
safely disposed of. 
 
One solution is to store the spent fuel as it is, by encasing and burying it deep 
underground in a stable geological formation. This implies demonstrating the durability 
of the additional barriers encasing it, since the assembly itself does not represent an 
optimal barrier. This solution also means virtually giving up any hope of taking 
advantage, even in the distant future, of the potential energy it still contains. Sweden 
has opted for this solution and the United States held it with priority in its nuclear power 
strategic planning of previous years.  
 
Another solution involves reprocessing the spent fuel. This means chemically 
separating its different components to manage each different category in a specific 
manner. The fact that the material handled is highly radioactive makes this a heavy 
and costly operation. Uranium, plutonium (perhaps, in the future, minor actinides too), 
and all highly radioactive fission products are separated in this way. Once isolated, 
they can be stored in the most suitable way, bearing in mind that most of their 
radioactivity will have disappeared in a few centuries. They are incorporated within a 
glass matrix, the composition of which is specially designed to house this complex 
mixture. The glass is very slow to corrode and will hardly release any radioactive 
product it incorporates.  
 
Reprocessing/recycling significantly reduces the amount of spent fuel stored in pools 
awaiting final disposal. 
 
4.2 REPROCESSING 
 
Spent fuel processing operations are aimed at recovering the materials that can be 
recycled – uranium and plutonium – and conditioning the "final" waste as effectively as 
possible. 
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When it is received for reprocessing, the spent fuel has already been stored in the 
spent fuel pool between six months and a year for allowing some of its activity to 
decrease substantially (i.e. "cooling"). This cooling continues in one of the pools at the 
reprocessing plant and the fuel is not to be reprocessed for some years: currently, the 
average figure is close to 8 years. The decrease in radioactivity is quite significant in 
the first few years and considerably simplifies subsequent operations. 
 
Shearing machines are used to cut off the end-pieces from the fuel, which are then 
sent to be rinsed, and to cut up the fuel rods into segments which drop into a dissolver 
via a feed spout. All the off-gases released during the shearing are extensively filtered 
and controlled before discharge. 
 
The dissolver is a wheel fitted with buckets. It rotates 30° at a time, completing a full 
revolution within 8 hours, thereby ensuring continuous operation. At the end of its 
travel, i.e. about every 2nd hour, each bucket empties its contents through a funnel to a 
helical ramp where the hulls are rinsed. End-pieces are rinsed in acid, then in water, 
and go to join the hulls in a storage drum ready for compacting. Compacting reduces 
the volume of waste to a quarter of its initial value. 
 
The solution is fed off-line to a centrifuge to separate the insoluble particles from the 
clarified solution. After clarification, the typical solution obtained from dissolution 
contains 200 g/l of uranium, 2.5 g/l of plutonium and 3.5 moles/l of nitric acid. It also 
contains 6 to 7 g/l of fission products. It then undergoes several extraction stages. 
 
First cycle extractions are at the heart of the process for they are used to separate and 
purify U and Pu, which can be recycled. All is done using a single solvent, tri-butyl-
phosphate (or TBP), diluted in a hydrocarbon similar to kerosene. The separation stage 
is divided into two phases: mixing and settling. In the mixing phase, a uranium- and 
plutonium-rich aqueous solution of fission products is stirred with the organic phase 
and forms an emulsion. During this phase, the uranium and plutonium show a 
preference for the organic compound, while the fission products and minor actinides 
have the opposite tendency. The second phase, settling, involves separating the 
emulsion components. This operation is repeated several times in counter-flow and the 
U and Pu are thus extracted in the TBP. 
 
The method selected to separate the plutonium from the uranium is by selective re-
extraction of the plutonium. This is done by reducing the plutonium, after which it 
returns to the aqueous phase. To re-extract the uranium water containing a small 
quantity of nitric acid is used. 
 
At the end of the first cycle, the plutonium and uranium have been separated not only 
from the fission products, but also from each other. A second cycle is carried out to 
obtain the degree of purity required for their recycling as fuels. Once separated, the 
uranium is recovered as uranyl nitrate. After re-enrichment, similarly to what was done 
with natural uranium, some of this uranium is recycled while the rest is stored. The 
plutonium is transformed into Pu oxide and used to make MOX fuel.  
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4.3 VITRIFICATION 
 
Vitrification is the process used to condition all fission products and actinides in a glass 
matrix. This glass matrix will contain almost all the fuel radioactivity (about 99.5%). It 
constitutes a final waste, meaning waste that has been stabilized and that contains no 
longer any reusable elements. 
 
After suitable preparation, the fission products solution is fed into the “calciner”, which 
is a rotating tube whose outer shell is heated to about 600 °C. The water evaporates, 
the nitrates are partially broken down, and the load becomes a solid calcine. It then 
drops into the melting furnace together with the glass frit, the basic compound allowing 
fission products to be incorporated. It is composed primarily of silica, boron, aluminum 
and sodium oxides. When the furnace is full, melting is continued for several hours to 
refine the glass.  
 
The melting furnace is then emptied. Each heat process represents 200 kg of glass, 
and two heats are required to fill a 150-liter glass canister (180 liters overall volume). 
This glass canister contains on average 84 kg of fission products and actinides and 
represents the waste for supplying the equivalent of 360 million kWh of electrical power 
consumption (by comparison, a French family of four people consumes in average 
1,000 kWh/year including electrical heating). 
 
The end product is left to cool for 24 hours, then inspected to ensure that the surface of 
the canister is not contaminated before being stored. It will not be removed from 
storage until it is ready to be sent to its final disposal site.  
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5 RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT 
 
High Level Waste – HLW disposal is certainly a question about which the perception of 
the specialists, aware of the progress achieved in the last two decades, differs deeply 
from the perception of the public-at-large and the media who, in general, are convinced 
it constitutes an insoluble problem. In order to bridge part of this gap, up-to-date 
information on the status of HLW disposal across the world is being provided in the 
following sections [5]. 
 
5.1  RADIOACTIVE WASTE CATEGORIES 
 
Each country has its own classification of radioactive waste. A simple definition would 
be: A radioactive substance is material that contains radioactive nuclei in amount or 
concentration high enough to motivate radiation protection measures. A radioactive 
waste is a radioactive substance resulting from a process of human activity and which 
has no foreseen use in the present technical and economic context and must be 
disposed of without harming people and environment. Three broad categories are 
being characterized: Low level waste LLW, intermediate level waste with long lived 
isotopes LL-ILW and high level waste HLW [6]. 
 
LLW constitutes the bulk of the radioactive waste in volume and in mass, although it 
contains only a small fraction of the total waste radioactivity. The origin of LLW is quite 
diverse: nuclear power, medicine, research, industry, etc. Many countries have 
licensed operating LLW disposal sites, usually surface storage sites which accept 
conditioned (immobilized) waste packages with such specifications as to assure that 
within two or three centuries, given the short radioactive period of most isotopes, the 
radioactivity of the disposal site will be of the same order of magnitude than the natural 
background radioactivity. 
 
LL-ILW and HLW originate almost exclusively from nuclear reactors and their fuel cycle 
facilities, as well as defense facilities of countries that have developed nuclear 
weapons. Though quite limited in volume, they constitute the bulk of the waste 
radioactivity. For those countries with no weapon activities and which do not reprocess 
their spent fuel, all their HLW and LL-ILW is inside their spent fuel assemblies which for 
them constitute the ultimate waste. In the following sections, only these two categories 
of waste will be considered. 
 
5.2 RADIOACTVE WASTE DISPOSAL 
 
Despite all the fear it inspires, radiation has two positive characteristics: 
 
 It is easy to detect at levels far below the detection threshold of any noxious 
substance (one can detect a single disintegration when one cannot detect a given 
chemical unless billions of molecules are present); 
 When detected, it is easy to protect oneself from radiation by a combination of three 
measures: keeping distance, limiting exposure time and providing shielding. 
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5.2.1 Containment, Storage, Transmutation 
 
The problem of radioactive waste disposal is therefore only a problem of containment: 
making sure the radioactive species will stay where they were located, or that the 
migration time from their original site to the biosphere will be long enough for the 
radioactivity to have decayed much below currently acceptable limits.  
 
The problem is exactly the same for the containment of the radioactive elements within 
a nuclear reactor, but in the case of HLW the volumetric activity is far smaller, while the 
containment time must be far longer. The solution, therefore, is basically the same: 
containment by multiple imbedded barriers. The first barrier is the matrix which 
contains the radioactive elements, then there is the waste packaging, and then 
additional barriers are added according to the chosen disposal method. 
 
The basic choice is between long term surface (or subsurface) storage and deep 
geological disposal. Transmutation of the longest lived elements might in the future be 
a preliminary operation in either method. 
 
In surface storage –sometimes called interim storage, the conditioned waste 
packages are stored in engineered facilities for a given period of time, to be retrieved 
from the facility at the end of the specified period. The facility may be located at ground 
level (surface facility) or shallowly buried (subsurface facility) in order to improve its 
physical protection against external aggression. Both surface and subsurface storage 
facilities must be kept under full surveillance and monitoring during the specified 
period, and one must demonstrate that the waste package can actually be retrieved if 
the decision is made to do so. Interim storage provides a satisfactory medium term 
solution, but it still leaves to our successors the burden of implementing a permanent 
disposal solution. 
 
In deep geologic disposal, the stratum itself constitutes the ultimate barrier against 
the migration of radioactive elements: once full, the disposal facility will be sealed off 
and one does not intend to retrieve the waste packages. This concept was put forward 
by the US National Academy of Sciences as early as 1957, upon request of the U.S. 
Atomic Energy Commission. However, in order to facilitate public acceptance, the 
concept is being refined into “reversible” geological disposal. In a reversible geological 
disposal, waste packages are intended to stay, but the possibility to reverse the 
decision and retrieve them is kept open for a significant period of time, ranging from 
one to a few centuries. In this way, even if it is meant to be a definitive solution, the 
best which can be implemented today, it does not preclude the possibility for our 
successors of finding an even better solution. For practical reasons, HLW will be held 
in a surface storage facility for a number of years before being sent to geological 
disposal. This allows all but the longer half-life radionuclides to decay and, thus, the 
heat source itself is substantially cooled down. 
 
During the first few centuries, most of the radioactivity of the waste comes from the 
decay of fission products; thereafter, the longer lived actinides (uranium, neptunium, 
plutonium, americium and curium) take over. When the spent fuel is reprocessed, 
recovered uranium and plutonium remain in the nuclear cycle and only traces of them, 
together with the fission products and the “minor” actinides are vitrified to constitute 
HLW packages. The radioactivity of vitrified HLW decays much more rapidly than the 
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radioactivity of non-reprocessed spent fuel. If one pushes the reprocessing one step 
further to recover the minor actinides (“partitioning”), curium could be conditioned to 
decay by itself while neptunium and americium could undergo fission in nuclear 
reactors to become “ordinary” fission products (“transmutation”). The radioactivity of 
the resulting HLW packages would decay even faster, and the necessary containment 
time within the disposal facility would be reduced. This is called P&T, for partitioning 
and transmutation. 
 
Implementing P&T would not eliminate the need for ultimate disposal, but it would 
alleviate some design constraints on the disposal facility. Partitioning has been 
developed at laboratory scale, and significant results have recently been obtained. 
Transmutation has been demonstrated experimentally, but present Light Water 
Reactors would be poor “transmuters”. The high neutron fluxes inside the core of a 
Fast Neutron Reactor would be much more efficient. Furthermore, a metal-fuelled Fast 
Neutron Reactor with integral reprocessing and fabrication facilities promises both high 
P&T efficiency and very low levels of trace actinide materials in the waste stream. P&T 
is therefore a possible useful future sophistication of the basic two methods above 
described. 
 
5.2.2 Current Radioactive Waste Disposal Programs 
 
As shown on Table 4, which is not exhaustive, many advances on radioactive waste 
disposal were achieved throughout the world during the last two decades. 
 
Almost all countries using nuclear power have studied geological disposal, through 
underground labs or “natural analogues”, and taken part in international round robin 
computer simulations. Main results show that glass and concrete, the most extensively 
studied matrices for HLW and LLW containment respectively, are remarkably durable. 
High integrity copper containers have also been developed for the geological disposal 
of spent fuel. If the proper site and the proper stratum are selected, the geological 
barrier is very efficient at preventing radioactive nuclides migration. 
 
While no demonstration of the behavior of a geological disposal facility can be fully 
rigorous and definitive, given the timescales involved, there are now many converging 
indices that the mechanisms governing the disposal evolution in time are understood 
and mastered, and that those mechanisms will induce minimal environmental impacts. 
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LL-ILW 
Since 1998, a disposal site is actually operating near Carlsbad 
(New Mexico, the WIPP, a non-reversible geological disposal 
in a salt bed, devoted to transuranic Defense waste disposal. 
USA 
Spent 
Fuel 
A disposal site for spent fuel in volcanic tuff (Yucca Mountain, 
Nevada) has been selected in 2002, with Congress approval 
despite State opposition. Licensing is in progress. Preliminary 
consideration is being given to reprocessing the spent fuel in 
order to increase the site capacity. 
Finland Spent Fuel 
Decision was taken in 2001 to build a reversible geological 
disposal in granite near Olkiluoto. The site should open around 
2015. An underground laboratory ONKALO is under 
construction. 
Sweden Spent Fuel 
Site selection is almost completed for a reversible geological 
disposal in granite. Target date for operation is 2015. An 
underground lab has been operating in Aspö since 1994. 
Switzerland HLW 
Two underground labs in granite (Grimsel) and clay (Mont 
Terri) are in operation. The Swiss law stipulates a geological 
disposal should open before 2040. 
Belgium HLW 
Many experiments have been carried out since 1984 in the Mol 
underground lab (in clay). Decision for a geological disposal 
site is expected in 2030. 
Japan HLW 
The law voted in 2000 foresees a geological disposal 
operational by 2040. JAEA has started construction of two 
underground labs. 
France HLW 
One underground lab in clay is operating. The law voted in 
2006 plans for a reversible geologic disposal in 2015-2020 and 
calls for interim storage and continued R&D on P&T. 
Germany HLW 
Extensive R&D was carried out in the 70s on geological 
disposal in a salt dome near Gorleben. A 10 year moratorium 
has been decreed in 2000. 
Spain Spent Fuel 
No search for a disposal site. A centralized storage is foreseen 
for 2010. 
Netherlands HLW Long-term storage in the HABOG facility. 
Canada Spent Fuel 
Storage was considered in 1998 “technically acceptable, but 
not socially”. Disposal policy is still under study by the 
government. 
UK LL-ILW Disposal policy under consideration. 
 
Table 4 
World Radioactive Waste Disposal Programs 
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6 URANIUM & PLUTONIUM RECYCLING 
 
When a uranium-based fuel (natural or slightly enriched) produces energy in a nuclear 
reactor, some of the neutrons produced by fission are captured by 238U nuclei which 
are transformed into 239Pu by two successive beta disintegrations. Like 235U, 239Pu is 
fissile. Some of it undergoes fission, thus generating energy, while another part 
captures a neutron to form 240Pu, which in turn can also capture a neutron to form 
241Pu, another fissile isotope. Subsequent captures will lead to the formation of 242Pu, 
and then americium and curium and so on. Plutonium is therefore an unavoidable by-
product of uranium fission. 
 
The plutonium produced in fuels is a mixture of isotopes, with atomic mass ranging 
from 238 to 242. The relative proportions of these isotopes depend on initial fuel 
composition and on how long the fuel was irradiated in the reactor. The fissile "quality" 
of this plutonium depends, of course, on these proportions, as even-numbered 
isotopes (238Pu, 240Pu and 242Pu) are not fissile in light water reactors. 
 
For example, PWR fuel initially made from uranium enriched with 4% 235U will contain 
about 1% plutonium at the end of its life, this plutonium being made up of 65% fissile 
239Pu and 241Pu isotopes. Towards the end of its life span, more power is released in 
the almost spent fuel by plutonium fission than by 235U fission. It has practically 
become a MOX fuel, as will be explained below.  
 
If the spent fuel is disposed of without processing it, all the plutonium will end up in final 
high-level waste. By separating out the plutonium through reprocessing, elimination of 
what would have been the most radioactive ingredient of the spent fuel a thousand 
years from now was achieved. In fact, it is the residual plutonium concentration in the 
glass that would represent the main source of radioactivity at that point in the future. 
 
Yet this plutonium (and, as a matter of fact, the residual enriched uranium which still 
makes up 95% of the spent fuel) represents a great deal of potential energy. Complete 
fission of one gram of plutonium generates more heat than complete combustion of 
one ton of oil. 
 
Plutonium can either be specifically conditioned to be buried, or –as is the case in 
France today– it can be recycled and manufactured into fuel known as MOX fuel. 
Uranium is stored in a chemically stable form until its recycling becomes an 
economically viable option. In France, some reprocessed uranium is recycled, after re-
enrichment, in two specially authorized reactors. 
 
Recycling saves enriched uranium, though the amount of money saved depends on 
the market price of the material, as the special precautions required for handling 
plutonium make it more expensive to manufacture MOX fuels than enriched-uranium 
fuels. On the other hand, recycling avoids the ever increasing quantities of plutonium 
inside the wastes which, as seen before, complicate waste management. Recycling 
also paves the way for effectively reclaiming the energy resources that this plutonium 
represents2. More effective management for the future may be worth a reasonable 
                                                 
2
 Here reference is made to the Fast Breeders, which optimize the use of uranium. 
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extra cost –especially since it does not affect the competitiveness of nuclear energy in 
relation to other sources of energy. 
 
Plutonium could be recycled under optimum conditions in fast neutron (breeder) 
reactors by using it to burn all the depleted uranium left over from enrichment 
operations. However, only a few prototypes of such reactors are currently in existence, 
and large-scale deployment is not expected in the near future.  
 
Today, plutonium is recycled in light water reactors –PWRs and BWRs– which are the 
most common nuclear power reactors in the world. This makes enriched uranium 
savings possible, by replacing it with plutonium, and prevents plutonium from ending 
up in final waste or piling up "on the shelf" after being separated during spent fuel 
reprocessing. The plutonium is recycled as MOX fuel.  
 
6.1 MIXED OXIDE FUEL - MOX 
 
MOX fuel is a mixture of plutonium and uranium oxides. Depleted uranium is generally 
used since plutonium is intended as a substitute for 235U. Viewed from the outside, 
MOX fuel for PWRs or BWRs is identical to the enriched-uranium fuel it replaces –
same assembly structure, same spacing, same rods, claddings, grids, and springs. The 
pellets enclosed in the claddings are of the same size – the only difference is their 
composition, and therefore, their manufacturing process. 
 
In the core of a light water reactor, one needs twice the amount of plutonium to obtain 
the energy equivalence of a 235U enriched fuel. A mixture containing about 8% 
plutonium and 92% depleted uranium is needed to replace 4% enriched uranium. At 
the end of its life span, MOX fuel will contain only about 4% plutonium3.  
 
MOX recycling began on an experimental basis in Belgium in the early 1960s. It was 
then industrialized in Belgium, Germany and Switzerland, followed by France as from 
1985. Japan is now preparing to allow MOX fuel in its BWRs and PWRs. 
 
In France, EdF decided to recycle its plutonium gradually in most of its 900 MWe 
reactors, by operating them on 30% MOX fuel (meaning that for each refueling 
operation, MOX fuel is used in about one third of fresh fuel assemblies). Out of 28 
reactors which could technically do so, 20 now use MOX fuel. By operating 20 reactors 
on one-third MOX fuel, all the plutonium extracted from the EdF fuel reprocessed at the 
La Hague plant can be recycled. The "plutonium account" of a "moxified" PWR is 
balanced, i.e. its MOX assemblies consume as much plutonium as its enriched-
uranium assemblies produce.  
                                                 
3
 As the initial plutonium undergoes fission, more of it is formed through capture in the depleted uranium. Some of 
this secondary plutonium is burned on site. The final concentration of 4% results from these three phenomena. The 
plutonium contained in spent MOX fuel is less fissile than the plutonium initially used in the fuel. 
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7 NUCLEAR POWER SAFETY AND RADIATION PROTECTION 
 
The radioactivity of uranium has potential health impacts when it is used to produce 
electricity. Ionizing radiation is produced when the nucleus of an atom disintegrates, 
releasing energy in the form of energetic particle waves of electromagnetic radiation. 
 
The generation of electrical energy is now the major use of the nuclear fuel cycle. All 
industrial activities involve some risk to human health and safety. No means of 
generating electricity is risk-free. In normal operation, a nuclear power plant releases 
very little pollution, chemical or radioactive. Paradoxically, it releases less radioactivity 
than a coal fired power plant. The choice of any technology or mixture of technologies 
will inevitably be a matter of balancing different costs, benefits, and risks.  
 
While considerable technical and management advance has been achieved over the 
last few decades with the safety of nuclear power installations, little advance has been 
achieved in the area of social acceptability. 
 
7.1 RADIATION PROTECTION 
 
Radiation exposure can arise from sources outside the body (external exposure) or 
from radioactive material inside the body (internal exposure). Radioactive material can 
enter the body by inhalation or ingestion in water or food.  
 
People are continuously exposed to natural background radiation although this may 
vary substantially from place to place. The worldwide average is 2.4 mSv/year, with 
maximum values above 12 mSv/year depending on local geology and altitude 4. There 
is no evidence that this variation leads to any differences in terms of human health. 
Evidence is emerging that the small background radiation exposure experienced by 
human beings may have a beneficial effect. The dose rate expected for individual 
members of the public from nuclear power generation is very low, on average 0.005 
mSv/year for people resident within 50 km of a pressurized water reactor power 
station. To place radiation exposure to the public in perspective, a person taking a 
return flight from Sydney to London would receive the same dose (approximately 0.25 
mSv) as someone living 50 years in the vicinity of such a power reactor. 
 
7.2 NUCLEAR POWER SAFETY 
 
The International Commission for Radiation Protection (ICRP) issues recommended 
guidelines on safety standards after ongoing review of the emerging scientific 
information from around the world. The standards are used as the basis of design 
criteria for all aspects of nuclear power plant radiation exposure for both workers and 
the general public. The following levels of exposure to ionizing radiation are the 
generally recommended limits above background levels: 
 1 mSv/year above natural background radiation for the general public; 
 100 µSv over five years for occupational exposure. 
 
Ionizing radiation exposure can only be detected and measured by instruments as the 
body has no natural detection mechanism for other than extreme situations. 
                                                 
4
 Doses as high as 300 mSv/year have been consistently measured in some district of the Ramsar Caspian Sea 
resort (Iran). 
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The fundamental safety requirement for all nuclear power stations is to ensure that no 
radioactive material or ionizing radiation from the area of the heat producing nuclear 
reaction is transmitted to any location at a level adversely impacting human safety or 
the environment. This isolation requirement is achieved in a number of linked ways: 
 Control of the nuclear reaction, most commonly by neutron absorbing control 
rods inserted partially or wholly (for shutdown) into the reactor core. The 
control rods are moved automatically through the station instrument and 
computer control systems. The control system monitors all operating 
parameters to maintain defined operating power levels or to shut the reactor 
down in the case of any emergency condition. 
 Removal of heat generated in the fuel from the nuclear reaction, typically 
achieved by a cooling water circuit for a nuclear power station. 
 An engineering design which ensures that all radioactive products or 
components are isolated or contained in locations away from possible harmful 
contact. 
 
In a modern nuclear power station design, the isolation barriers start with fuel 
metallurgy designed to hold or contain radioactive products both internally and within a 
surrounding metal barrier. A fuel element is now typically a string of ceramic uranium 
oxide pellets that are held in a sealed metal tube. The second isolation barrier is a fully 
enclosed reactor heat transfer system -most commonly water- in a steel pressure 
vessel, pumps, heat exchangers, and associated pipe work. The third isolation barrier 
is an enclosing building designed to be leak tight in the event of any release of 
pressure from the reactor cooling system. The reactor containment building may itself 
consist of a number of layered barriers and is generally now designed to withstand 
external breach by an aircraft crash. 
 
The ongoing integrity and effectiveness of the engineered safety isolations noted 
above is maintained over the life cycle of a modern nuclear power station principally by 
thoroughly managed design, construction, operation, and maintenance processes 
taking into account all of the experience and lessons from the past. 
 
A key part of the design is the incorporation of systems capable of monitoring and 
assessing all plant operating conditions or any deviation from operating limits, and 
initiating immediate action to correct any deviation ultimately by shutting the reactor 
down. The ongoing development and reliability of modern computer-based systems 
now allows a much wider range of monitoring, assessment, and control systems to be 
incorporated supporting plant operators with overall control information than was 
available for past designs. Even given the sophistication and reliability of modern 
control systems, it is normal to allow at least three levels of isolated redundancy within 
the design and installation. 
 
7.3 NUCLEAR POWER PLANT ACCIDENTS 
 
General community concern most likely remains related to the potential risk of a single 
serious accident similar to those at Chernobyl and Three Mile Island nuclear power 
stations.  
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The Three Mile Island accident in March 1979, while a large financial cost to the 
company involved, injured no one and led indirectly to the release of only minor 
amounts of radioactive elements which after extensive expert review, had no 
measurable impact on health. Resulting from human error, it demonstrated the 
robustness of the reactor design and the value of containment structures required in all 
Western nuclear power plants when an operational failure caused severe damage to 
the reactor core. 
 
The Chernobyl accident in April 1986, a typical case of lack of safety culture, caused 
the deaths of less than 50 workers [7] and emergency staff and released radioactive 
gas and dust high into the atmosphere. Over the time since the accident, there have 
been approximately 2,000 thyroid cancers in children (mostly in Belarus and Ukraine) 
and the Chernobyl Forum considers likely that a maximum of up to 4000 premature 
deaths from radiation may eventually occur among the 600,000 most irradiated people. 
The design of the reactor was inherently unstable and there was no containment 
structure, a common feature of most Western designs. The accident occurred at 
shutdown power levels as staff was testing safety performance parameters, outside the 
prescribed operating limits for the reactor and in violation of existing regulations for the 
safe operation of the reactor. 
 
There was a twofold reaction to the accidents. Public opinion forced a slowdown or 
hold on the power reactor construction programs by governments around the world and  
the responsible technical/safety regulators undertook a wide range of design and 
operational reviews based on the outcome of the accident investigations. Public 
concerns based on real or imagined information remains strong. Over the decades 
since the accidents the international technical and regulatory community has moved 
forward to the point where engineering design, equipment development and 
operational practice has made very considerable advances to enhance general safety 
for both existing and new designs of nuclear based electricity generating capacity.  
 
7.4 SAFETY CULTURE 
 
Above all of the engineered safety features that might be incorporated in design, 
construction, and operation of modern nuclear power stations, or any similar facility 
requiring high reliability of operation, the experience of the past shows that the safety 
culture of the controlling organization is of paramount importance. 
 
The overall safety culture of the organization reflects on every aspect of nuclear plant 
design construction and operation through the balance of factors and sometimes 
conflicting interests that need to be managed. Factors such as time, finance, customer 
issues, staffing levels, operating principles, and maintenance philosophy can all have 
an influence on how safety matters are viewed and resolved within the controlling 
organization. 
 
An uncompromising focus on safety leadership and safety responsibility at the most 
senior executive levels and down through all levels of line management has proven to 
be the most important directing influence in the development of best practice safety 
culture for any organization. Safety monitoring or advisory or training roles within the 
organization are important but ultimately these roles can only support executive 
management responsibilities and not act as a substitute or alternate. Experience has 
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shown that large safety divisions in high reliability organizations can be 
counterproductive with many management and staff abrogating responsibility for safety 
to the safety division or at best allowing confusion of responsibility. The ultimate and 
most desirable outcome is that all staff accept personal and collective responsibility for 
safety leadership within their sphere of influence and to the best of their ability.  
 
There are now many excellent (and poor) safety culture examples documented across 
the nuclear power sector, across countries, and across all other industries to provide 
both benchmark examples and guidance for the highly effective and safe operation of 
nuclear power plants. Extensive investigations of a number of serious accidents 
particularly in the international oil and gas industry have highlighted the need for 
effective management of organization safety culture covering all levels of operation. 
The key areas of attention for the development and ongoing maintenance of an 
excellent safety culture include; owner and management commitment, workforce 
empowerment, workforce hiring and training methods, pre-project planning and risk 
mitigation, and prompt accident and near-miss investigation with timely implementation 
of improvement recommendations. 
 
7.5 INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY 
 
After the accident at Chernobyl a truly international nuclear safety regime was fully 
developed. This regime is based on binding international conventions, internationally 
accepted safety standards, and an extensive system of peer reviews. IAEA safety 
standards are periodically revised and updated to reflect the state of the art for nuclear 
safety, and to include new areas, such as the nuclear fuel cycle; modern techniques 
such as human/machine interaction, and assessment of the probability of occurrence 
of certain postulated accidents. These standards are now accepted worldwide and 
although not obligatory, have been adopted by several countries on a voluntary basis, 
and used as the basis of national regulations in numerous other member States. 
 
The International Atomic Energy Agency Convention on Nuclear Safety is an 
agreement that sets out the guiding principles under which the international community 
accepts responsibility for the safety of all nuclear related installations under their 
various jurisdictions. The objectives of the Convention are: 
 To achieve and maintain a high level of nuclear safety worldwide through the 
enhancement of national measures and international cooperation including, 
where appropriate, safety related technical cooperation; 
 To establish and maintain effective defenses in nuclear installations against 
potential radiological hazards in order to protect individuals, society, and the 
environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation from such installations; 
 To prevent accidents with radiological consequences and to mitigate such 
consequences should they occur. 
 
The Convention, adopted in June 1994, has 59 parties and 65 signatories as of May 
2006. The scope of the Convention defines a wide range of provisions that apply to the 
safety of nuclear installations. There are provisions to cover; the implementation of an 
appropriate legal, regulatory, and reporting framework; the review upgrading or closing 
of existing nuclear installations; the focus on nuclear safety as a priority, ensuring 
adequate financial and human resources to support appropriate safety levels; keeping 
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radiation exposure as low as reasonably achievable, and providing and testing 
emergency plans.  
 
Safety requirements for location, design, construction, and operation are also covered 
in the Convention. There is provision for joint review and information sharing by the 
contracting parties to the Convention and for the ongoing management review of the 
Convention processes and documentation. 
 
Supporting the implementation of all aspects of the Convention is a wealth of 
documentation and training resources incorporating the research and experience of 
members of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The extent of knowledge is huge 
and most of the information can be traced back to origins in the large research 
programs carried out in the mid to late 20th-century.  
 
The extent of information available ensures that all elements of nuclear safety and 
radiation protection engineering for new or existing installations can be adequately 
covered. Ionizing radiation and its health impacts are well understood and there are 
established international safety standards that can be utilized for all operational 
practice. 
 
On a comparative basis the safety record of the nuclear industry is orders of magnitude 
better than coal or oil or natural gas generation of electrical energy. The reasons for 
this outcome can be traced back to both the level of investment in safety related plant 
engineering and well understood international safety standards and regulation. 
Comprehensive incident reporting and dissemination of resulting information under the 
guidance of the IAEA has resulted in a worldwide culture of safety driven continuous 
improvement for both existing nuclear power station operations and new designs. 
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8 NUCLEAR POWER AND CLIMATE CHANGE 
 
In February 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change IPCC Group 1, in 
charge of synthesizing the scientific evidence, published its executive Summary [8] 
stating that: 
 Changes in the atmospheric abundance of greenhouse gases and aerosols, in 
solar radiation and in land surface properties alter the energy balance of the 
climate system. These changes are expressed in terms of radiative forcing 
which is used to compare how a range of human and natural factors drive 
warming or cooling influences on global climate. Since the Third Assessment 
Report (TAR) issued in 2001 [9], new observations and related modelling of 
greenhouse gases, solar activity, land surface properties and some aspects of 
aerosols have led to improvements in the quantitative estimates of radiative 
forcing. 
 Global atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous 
oxide have increased markedly as a result of human activities since 1750 and 
now far exceed pre-industrial values determined from ice cores spanning many 
thousands of years. The global increases in carbon dioxide concentration are 
due primarily to fossil fuel use and land-use change (Fig. 11), while those of 
methane and nitrous oxide are primarily due to agriculture. 
 The understanding of anthropogenic warming and cooling influences on 
climate has improved since the Third Assessment Report (TAR), leading to 
very high confidence that the globally averaged net effect of human activities 
since 1750 has been one of warming, with a radiative forcing of +1.6 [+0.6 to 
+2.4] W/m2. 
 Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from 
observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, 
widespread melting of snow and ice, and rising global average sea level. 
 
 
 
Figure 11 
Variation of CO2 Atmospheric Concentration 
Changes in Greenhouse Gases from Ice-Core and Modern Data 
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Society is therefore faced with a terrible dilemma: more energy is needed to allow for 
the human development of vast regions of the world, but reduction of CO2 emissions 
for fear of endangering the planet’s climatic equilibrium is also urgent, while, today, 
80% of the world primary energy is supplied by the combustion of oil (35%), coal (24%) 
and gas (21%), followed by the uncontrolled release of the CO2 [10]. 
 
There is no single way out of this dilemma; it will be necessary to implement every 
available measure, like: 
 Using rationally the energy resources (the so-called energy conservation) and 
increasing their use efficiency; 
 Reducing the share of fossil fuel in the energy supply matrix and increasing the 
share of sources emitting few greenhouse effect gases GHG (renewable and 
nuclear energies); 
 Capturing and storing CO2 wherever practicable. 
 
Nuclear power and renewable energy sources emit very few GHG as shown on Fig. 12 
[11]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: IAEA 2006 
 
Figure 12 
Life-cycle emissions of GHG (in equivalent g CO2) 
to generate 1 kilowatt-hour of electricity. 
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9 INTERNATIONAL REGIME OF NON-PROLIFERATION 
 
The term "proliferation" refers to the rise in the number of States in possession of 
nuclear weapons. It is sometimes extended to describe the misappropriation of 
weapons or fissile material by sub-national groups5. The term "nonproliferation", on the 
other hand, refers to the political or technical means implemented to combat 
proliferation [12]. 
 
9.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
The first atomic explosion was achieved July 16, 1945 in the desert of New Mexico 
(USA). The following months, two A-bombs destroyed the Japanese cities of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, leading to the end of World War II. No atomic weapon has ever since 
been used in war. The United Stated first tried to protect its military nuclear monopoly 
by refusing any transfer of civil nuclear technology. After proliferation occurred with the 
USSR (1949), President Eisenhower changed this policy and allowed other countries 
access to reactor technology in exchange for their commitment to using the technology 
for civil applications only. During the Cold War, the United Kingdom (1952), then 
France (1960), and lastly China (1964), joined the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS). 
 
In 1968, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT, attempted to freeze the situation by 
recognizing five NWS (USA, USSR, UK, France and China) but no more. Other parties 
to the NPT (NNWS) took the commitment to never try to acquire nuclear weapons. In 
exchange, the NWS committed to reduce their arsenal and give free rein to civil 
technology transfers, in addition to support militarily any NNWS party if menaced with 
nuclear weapons. The International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, was entrusted with 
the task of overseeing the peaceful use of nuclear materials in compliance with the 
NPT obligations. Under IAEA control, technology transfer agreements multiplied 
rapidly, each exporter imposing on the recipient its own conditions for the use of the 
technologies, facilities, and materials exported. The NPT entered into force in 1970. 
 
In 1974, India, which had not signed the NPT, carried out a "peaceful explosion", using 
plutonium produced in a heavy water reactor supplied by Canada. Exporting nations 
then formed the “London Club” which later became the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) 
to regulate "sensitive" exports. 
 
In 1991, a similar shock was felt with the discovery of the extensive clandestine nuclear 
program of Iraq, a country that had signed and ratified the NPT. As a result, the powers 
and inspection capabilities of the IAEA were reinforced. 
 
With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the USSR, the Russian 
Federation became sole inheritor of the former nation's NWS status. In 1991, after 
abrogating the apartheid, South Africa, having dismantled its handful of nuclear 
weapons, joined the NPT. Argentina and Brazil both stopped their military 
developments, ratified the Tlatelolco Treaty that, in the 60s, created the Latin American 
Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, with obligations somewhat similar to those of the NPT, 
                                                 
5
 This does not cover the issue of “dirty bombs”, i.e. the dissemination of radioactive products by a conventional 
explosive. On the one hand, a dirty bomb may be used by terrorists to create panic but it would not kill many people, 
and on the other hand, the major risk does not come from materials used in the nuclear power sector but rather from 
the many radioactive sources in various industries, hospitals, etc. 
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and entered the NPT. After decades of increasing their arsenals, all NWS but China 
started drastic reductions. Negotiations were carried out towards a Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty CTBT and a “cut-off” convention to stop producing fissile materials for 
military purposes. On the other hand, Pakistan, India's rival since the 1948 partition, 
carried out its "peaceful explosion" in 1999.  
 
A third serious crisis erupted in 2003. On the one hand, North Korea withdrew from the 
NPT, and on the other hand it was discovered that, apparently unbeknownst to its own 
government, Dr A. Q. Khan, the “father of the Pakistani bomb”, had established a black 
market of military nuclear technology with Libya, North Korea and Iran. This, in turn, led 
to the discovery that Iran, a NPT Party, had been carrying out a clandestine undeclared 
and un-safeguarded program of uranium enrichment. This triggered a crisis still going 
on nowadays, although the IAEA Director General has consistently said there is "no 
evidence" Iran has ever maintained a program of developing nuclear weapons. 
 
In the fall of 1966, North Korea performed some kind of atomic test, but it appears that 
it will resume its re-entry into the NPT regime. 
 
The NPT, backed up by IAEA inspections, now forms the universally acknowledged 
basis for all nuclear commerce. As of today, only three countries are not Parties to the 
NPT: India, Israel and Pakistan. 
 
The non-proliferation regime has proven highly successful. Back in the 60s, it was 
widely forecasted that by 2000 there would be at least 30 countries possessing nuclear 
weapons: as a matter of fact, only 3 or 4 additional countries have crossed the 
threshold.  
 
The Regime is robust because it has proven to be adaptable: after each crisis, a 
response has been –sometimes slowly– implemented: 
 After 1974, it was the establishment of the NSG and the definition of the 
“trigger list” of suspicious or “dual” items not to be freely exported. 
 After 1991, it was the Additional Protocol and the adoption by the NSG of the 
“full scope safeguards6”. 
 NPT parties are still in the throes of adopting suitable measures to cope with 
the consequences of the North Korea and Iran crises. It appears likely that 
some restrictions or specific limitations will be required for “sensitive 
technologies”. 
 
9.2 CIVIL NUCLEAR INDUSTRY AND PROLIFERATION 
 
The first application of nuclear fission was the atom bomb, and not nuclear power. 
Fission cannot unfortunately be "un-invented", and there will always be some risk that a 
State or a large sub-national group would decide to make nuclear weapons, to devote 
to that purpose the required financial and technical efforts, and to bear the political 
consequences. 
 
                                                 
6
 Under this rule, no nuclear material or facility can be transferred unless the recipient country has put all its nuclear 
facilities under IAEA safeguards. 
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On the other hand, no country opting for proliferation has yet done so by 
misappropriating materials or facilities covered by commitments to peaceful use and 
under IAEA safeguards.  
 
Bearing that in mind, the real question is this: does the development of nuclear energy 
for civil applications increase or reduce the risks of nuclear weapons proliferation? 
Although possessing a civil nuclear facility within its borders may give a State quicker 
access to the necessary fissile materials, a civil nuclear industry also means 
international agreements and treaties, commitments not to misappropriate materials, 
and international inspections with highly sensitive and effective measuring devices. It 
would make it much more difficult to carry out a clandestine program as it can be 
witnessed from the North Korean and Iranian experiences. 
 
9.2.1 “Proliferating" Technologies 
 
Most nuclear technologies are not “sensitive” in terms of nuclear weapons 
development. LWRs produce plutonium of poor “military” quality and are easy to 
control since they must be shut down to unload the fuel. On-line refueling reactors 
(Magnox, AGR, Candu, and RBMK) have the intrinsic capability to easily produce 
weapon-grade plutonium, and must and can therefore be more carefully controlled and 
safeguarded.  
 
The most sensitive technologies are today the centrifuge enrichment and the spent fuel 
reprocessing (if associated with low burnup fuel). 
 
Proliferation is essentially a matter of political will, not technology. It is difficult to 
determine exactly how "proliferating" a technology is. Different factors must be taken 
into account, like ease of access to pure concentrated fissile material, detectability, 
throughput, etc. 
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10 COST OF ENERGY GENERATED BY NUCLEAR-POWER 
 
Nuclear power can only meaningfully be compared to the other main sources of base 
load electricity. In places where hydropower it can generate base load electricity, the 
cost is so site-dependent that any comparison is very specific.  
 
Nuclear power is capital intensive but cheap to operate: its competitiveness depends 
heavily on the mode of financing and the cost of money, and very little on the fuel cost. 
The cost of electricity generated by nuclear power is quite insensitive to the variations 
of uranium prices in the international market -a cost that for other options depends 
considerably from the hypotheses on the future prices of the fuel over the plant lifetime. 
As a result, projected kWh costs for comparison purposes can widely differ from one 
country to another and from one study to another. 
 
In 2005, the Nuclear Energy Agency of OECD, together with the International Energy 
Agency, updated their projected costs of nuclear electricity production, for plants to be 
commissioned between 2010 and 2015 [13]. It is still the most recent exhaustive cost 
comparison available today. The costs calculated were busbar costs at the station, 
without costs of transmission and distribution. The calculations were based on the 
levelised lifetime costs approach, assuming an 85% load factor over 40 years of 
economic lifetime and discount rates of 5% and 10% (only Japan uses substantially 
lower discount rates). The nuclear costs include refurbishing and decommissioning, but 
the savings to society of avoiding CO2 emissions were not included. Table 5 
summarizes the results. 
 
Levell ii sed  ll ii ff e tt ii me  costt   (( $ // MWh))   
Dii scountt   rr att e  Technoll ogy  Over
r nii ghtt   II nvestt mentt   
$// kWh  
5%  10%  
Coal 1000 - 1500  25 - 50  36 - 60 
Gas 400 - 800  37 - 60  40 - 63 
Nuclear 1000 - 2000  21 – 31*  30 – 50* 
* except Japan Source: OECD NEA - IEA, Projected Costs of Generating Electricity, 2005 Update 
 
Table 5 
Generation costs of different technologies 
 
When all uncertainties are taken into account, the study suggests that none of the 
three main electricity generating technologies can be expected to be the cheapest in all 
situations, but that nuclear power is often competitive. If some cost had been included 
for CO2 emissions, the competitiveness of nuclear power would have been even more 
significant. 
 
As for “Generation 3” nuclear power plants, some -like the EPR- are now under 
construction. Indicative values from three different European countries are shown in 
Table 6. 
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COUNTRY FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY 
Net capacity (MWe) 1500  1590 1590 
Overnight cost (€/kW) 1656  1360 (1) 1550 
Operation & Maintenance cost (€/kW)  40.0  40.3  56.8 
Fuel cycle cost (€/MWh)  4.3  4.6  4.2 
Total (€/MWh) (10% discount rate)  36.7  34.0  36.7 
(1) For a series of 10 EPR Source: OECD NEA - IEA, Projected Costs of Generating Electricity, 2005 Update 
including the 1st of a kind 
 
Table 6 
Estimated EPR generation cost 
 
Since 2005, many parameters have changed: oil, gas and uranium prices have 
escalated. Not only fuel prices are higher, though in the case of nuclear power their 
influence in the final kWh cost is much lower, but also the prices of steel and concrete 
which will impact investment costs. That is why comparisons tend to be parametric in 
accordance to oil and gas prices. 
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11 NUCLEAR POWER WORLDWIDE: STATUS AND OUTLOOK 
 
Nuclear power share of worldwide electricity production rose from less than 1 percent 
in 1960 to 16 percent in 1986, and that percentage has held essentially constant in the 
21 years since 1986. Nuclear electricity generation has grown steadily at the same 
pace as overall global electricity generation. Table 7 shows the current nuclear power 
generation status among countries [2]. 
 
NUCLEAR ELECTRICITY 
GENERATION 2006 
REACTORS 
OPERABLE May 2007 
REACTORS UNDER 
CONSTRUCTION May 2007 
REACTORS 
PLANNED May 2007  
billion kWh  % e  No.  MWe  No.  MWe  No. MWe  
Argentina  7.2 6.9 2 935 1 692 0 0 
Armenia  2.4 42 1 376 0 0 0 0 
Belgium  44.3 54 7 5728 0 0 0 0 
Brazil  13.0 3.3 2 1901  0 0 1 1245 
Bulgaria  18.1 44 2 1906 0 0 2 1900 
Canada*  92.4 16 18 12595 2 1540 4 4000 
China  51.8 1.9 11 8587 4 3170 23 24500 
Czech Republic  24.5 31 6 3472 0 0 0 0 
Egypt  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Finland  22.0 28 4 2696 1 1600 0 0 
France  428.7 78 59 63473 0 0 1 1630 
Germany  158.7 32 17 20303 0 0 0 0 
Hungary  12.5 38 4 1773 0 0 0 0 
India  15.6 2.6 17 3779 6 2976 4 2800 
Iran  0 0 0 0 1 915 2 1900 
Japan  291.5 30 55 47700 2 2285 11 14945 
Korea DPR (North)  0 0 0 0 0 0 1 950 
Korea RO (South)  141.2 39 20 17533 1 950 7 8250 
Lithuania  8.0 69 1 1185 0 0 0 0 
Mexico  10.4 4.9 2 1310 0 0 0 0 
Netherlands  3.3 3.5 1 485 0 0 0 0 
Pakistan  2.6 2.7 2 400 1 300 2 600 
Romania  5.2 9.0 1 655 1 655 0 0 
Russia  144.3 16 31 21743 5 2720 8 9600 
Slovakia  16.6 57 5 2064 2 840 0 0 
Slovenia  5.3 40 1 696 0 0 0 0 
South Africa  10.1 4.4 2 1842 0 0 1 165 
Spain  57.4 20 8 7442 0 0 0 0 
Sweden  65.1 48 10 9076 0 0 0 0 
Switzerland  26.4 37 5 3220 0 0 0 0 
Turkey  0 0 0 0 0 0 3 4500 
Ukraine  84.8 48 15 13168 0 0 2 1900 
United Kingdom  69.2 18 19 10982 0 0 0 0 
USA  787.2 19 103 98254 1 1200 2 2716 
WORLD 2,658 16 437 370,163 30 22,443 74 81,601 
Source: WNA Reactor data 
Table 7 
World Nuclear Power Reactors  
 
At the close of 2006, nuclear provided about 15 percent of total electricity worldwide 
[3]. 
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11.1 CURRENT STATUS 
 
Present nuclear power plant expansion is centered in Asia: 19 of the 34 units under 
construction at the end of 2007, and 30 of the last 40 reactors to have been connected 
to the grid, were in Asia.  
 
India currently gets less than 3% of its electricity from nuclear, but at the end of 2006 it 
had one-quarter of the nuclear construction (7 units) of the world reactors that were 
under construction at that time. India plans are even more impressive: an 8-fold 
increase by 2022 to 10 percent of the electricity supply and a 75-fold increase by 2052 
to reach 26 percent of the electricity supply. A 75-fold increase works out to an average 
of 9.4 percent/yr, about the same average of the global nuclear growth from 1970 
through 2004.  
 
China is experiencing a huge energy growth and is trying to expand every source it 
can, including nuclear power. It has four reactors under construction and plans a nearly 
five-fold expansion by just 2020. Because China is growing so fast this would still 
amount to only 4 percent of total electricity. 
 
Russia had 31 operating reactors, five under construction and significant expansion 
plans. There is discussion in Russia of becoming a full fuel-service provider, including 
services like leasing fuel, reprocessing spent fuel for other countries, and even leasing 
reactors. 
 
Japan had 55 reactors in operation, one under construction, and plans to increase the 
nuclear power share of electricity from 30 percent in 2006 to more than 40 percent 
within the next decade. 
 
South Korea connected last year its 20th nuclear power unit, has another under 
construction, and has broken ground to start building two more. Nuclear power already 
supplies 39 percent of its electricity. 
 
Although Europe had 166 reactors in operation and six under construction, there are 
nuclear phase-out countries like Germany and Belgium, and several nuclear prohibition 
countries like Austria, Italy, Denmark and Ireland. On the other hand, nuclear 
expansion programs exist in Finland, France, Bulgaria and Ukraine. Finland started 
construction of Olkiluoto-3 in 2005, the first new Western European construction since 
1991. France started a new plant in 2007. 
 
Several countries with nuclear power are still pondering future plans. The UK, with 19 
operating plants, many of which are relatively old, has been uncertain until recently. 
Although a final policy decision on nuclear power will await the results of a public 
consultation now underway, a White Paper on energy published in May 2007 
concluded that "...having reviewed the evidence and information available we believe 
that the advantages [of new nuclear power] outweigh the disadvantages and that the 
disadvantages can be effectively managed. On this basis, the Government preliminary 
view is that it is in the public interest to give the private sector the option of investing in 
new nuclear power stations." 
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The US had 103 reactors providing 19 percent of the country electricity. For the last 
few decades the main developments have been improved capacity factors, power 
increases at existing plants and license renewals. Currently 48 reactors have already 
received 20-year renewals, so their licensed lifetimes will reach 60 years. Altogether 
three-quarters of the US reactors either have already license renewals, have applied 
for them, or have stated their intention to apply. There have been announced intentions 
for about 30 new reactors and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is now reviewing 
four Early Site Permit applications. 
 
11.2 OUTLOOK FOR 2030 
 
The IAEA makes two annual projections concerning the growth of nuclear power, a low 
and a high. The low projection assumes that all nuclear capacity that is currently under 
construction or firmly in the development pipeline gets completed and attached to the 
grid, but no other capacity is added. In this low projection, there would be growth in 
capacity from 370 GW(e) at the end of 2006 to 447 GW(e) in 2030 (Fig. 13).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13 
Projection of Installed Nuclear Power Capacity Worldwide 
 
In the IAEA high projection -which adds in additional reasonable and promising 
projects and plans- global nuclear capacity is estimated to rise to 691 GW(e) in 2030. 
That would be an average growth rate of about 2.5%/yr. 
 
It should be pointed out that the projections of the World Nuclear Association - WNA 
are in agreement with those of the IAEA (Fig. 14). 
Year
High Projection
Low Projection
South East Asia
Africa
Latin America
Middle East & South Asia
North America
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Far East
Western Europe
Low Projection
Historical Growth
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Figure 14 
Comparison of IAEA and WNA Projections 
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12 INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS 
 
Nuclear power is a demanding technology which cannot be safely implemented without 
minimum technical, scientific and organisational infrastructures. Some are detailed 
below. 
 
a) Grid requirements 
Whether planned or unplanned, the shutdown of a power source causes a jolt on the 
grid. By a rule of thumb, it is unadvisable to have on any grid a node exceeding one 
tenth of the total grid capacity. Nuclear power plants (NPP) are big in order to be 
economical: each unit rates typically 1000 MWe or more. Nuclear power, therefore, 
makes little sense on grids below 10 GWe (of course, the size of an interconnected 
grid may far exceed the size of a given national grid). This will not be the case if 
development of medium size modular reactors -with a fraction of 1,000 MWe unit 
capacity- becomes proven technology. 
 
b) Initial reactor supply and operation 
In most cases, the first NPP is acquired under a turnkey contract, from an external 
supplier. To protect itself, this supplier will require the receiving country to be a part to 
the Paris or Vienna Convention on nuclear liabilities. A BOT (Build, Operate, and 
Transfer) contract may help introduce a newcomer state to nuclear power by providing 
a transition period during which the plant is actually operated by the supplier with the 
future domestic operators being properly trained. 
 
Operator training is absolutely essential, including basic nuclear education, safety, 
radiation protection, plant operation and training on a plant simulator for accident 
management. The training is often offered by the vendor, but international 
organisations like the IAEA and WANO can help. 
 
Maintenance personnel must also receive a proper training, especially in radiation 
protection. 
 
When a country develops a nuclear programme, usually the construction of the plants 
is made with local resources, assuming the proper manpower and infrastructure are 
available. 
 
c) Fuel Supply 
Complete fuel supply services are easily available. Acquiring domestic fuel cycle 
facilities makes only sense when a sizeable nuclear programme is already in operation. 
 
d) International Regime 
As explained before, any newcomer must enter the international regime on Non-
proliferation (NPT, Safeguards Agreement, and Additional Protocol) and on Safety. 
 
e) National Organisation 
A prerequisite to acquiring and operating nuclear facilities is the establishment of a 
National Safety Authority, technically competent and fully independent from the 
Operator of the facility. This Authority must have the actual power to shutdown any 
facility it no longer deems fully sure and secure. Usually, the same Authority is also in 
charge of radiation protection. 
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The proper management of the wide scope of activities to be planned and implemented 
for the first nuclear power plant project in a country represents a major challenge for 
the involved government, utility, regulatory, supplier and other supportive organizations 
(Figure 15). Experience has shown that the time frame from the initial policy decision 
by the State to the operation of the first nuclear power plant is at least 10 to 15 years 
[14], [15]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15 
Infrastructure Development Program 
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